Rights as Usual

It is my pleasure to welcome Professor Danielle Anne Pamplona and Miguel Ángel Barboza López to Rights as Usual. Professor Pamplona is a Professor at the Post-Graduate Programme at the School of Law at Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná-Brazil. She was a Visiting Scholar at the American University (2015-16), at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2019), and at the Bonavero Institute for Human Rights (2022). She is also the Co-President of the Global Business and Human Rights Scholars Association.

Miguel Ángel Barboza López is Senior Project Manager and Researcher for the Rule of Law Programme for Latin America at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and Regional Representative for South America at the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. He holds a Master’s degree in International Human Rights Law from the University of Notre Dame, and he is also a university lecturer.

This post is theirs.

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The recent Advisory Opinion 32/25 on Climate Emergency and Human Rights (AO) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) responds to a request made by Colombia and Chile on the relationship between human rights; the challenges posed by the consequences of the climate emergency, such as droughts, floods and fires; corporate conduct; and States’ obligations including to regulate businesses activities when facing what it calls climate emergency.

The long-awaited and widely debated AO provides a concept of climate emergency, its causes and impacts; the international legal frameworks that tackle these impacts and their interpretation by different organizations and treaty bodies; states’ obligations to respect and guarantee rights in the context of the climate emergency; and substantive and procedural rights impacted by climate emergency. This blog will focus on a so far less explored area: the IACtHR’s bold approach to the right to science. The right to science consists of ensuring that everyone has access to and can participate in scientific progress and enjoy its benefits. Scientific progress must have a pluralistic vision, that is, it must include the ancestral knowledge of indigenous peoples and different vulnerable groups. The Court’s AO is remarkable in many ways, which we explain in this blog post. First, the IACtHR has framed the right to science, not only as a substantive right but also as a procedural right. Second, the Court has highlighted the importance of including indigenous ancestral knowledge in the recognition of the right to science and the importance of companies and States incorporating a pluralistic and democratic vision of this right.

The right to science and the use of science in the Court’s reasoning

The Court expressly recognized the right to science, noting that it is enshrined in the Organization of American States (OAS)  Charter and protected under the American Convention on Human Rights. It emphasized that this right is both substantive—since people are entitled to the knowledge produced by science—and procedural, insofar as it enables the exercise of other fundamental rights. In this sense, the Court not only affirmed that individuals have the right to access scientific knowledge but also relied on this very right by drawing on the best available scientific evidence on climate change to conclude that we are facing a climate emergency and that corporations bear responsibility for it. Thus, the Court’s reasoning about the right to science simultaneously provides the justification for its own reliance on science in the Advisory Opinion. In the section devoted specifically to the right to science, the Court also justifies its own use of science to establish the existence of climate change and the conceptualisation of a climate emergency.

The Court draws on science from the outset of its reasoning, as it is essential to establish what climate change is before assessing the scope of the State’s obligations in relation to it. To understand how climate change affects natural systems and what the impacts are on human beings, the Court relies on what it recognises as the best science (64). It was also the contributions of the best science that enabled the Court to conclude that climate change does indeed constitute a climate emergency (182; 183) and, finally, the best science was also available to the Court to define the obligations of States (216).

The right to science in the context of the climate emergency: also a procedural right

In the context of the climate emergency, the right to science translates into a substantive right (471) and a procedural right (473). Thus, there is an autonomous right that allows individuals to demand respect and protection from the State, as the right to science is the basis for environmental and climate protection. But beyond that, its procedural dimension implies that it is a “set of basic rights” without which human rights in the environmental and climate framework cannot be guaranteed. This set of basic procedural rights consists of access to information, participation and access to justice, as the Court has already explained. These rights have been addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its extensive case law, such as in the Advisory Opinion 23/17, in relation to the right to the environment, and as it is established by the Escazú Agreement. Now, the Court recognises that, in the fight against the climate emergency, other procedural rights are important, including the right to science (471-487).

To guarantee the right to science, in its substantive and procedural composition, states must exercise enhanced due diligence (236). This is a new requirement that the Inter-American Court extends here to cases beyond situations of armed conflict. This leads us to consider that the right to science can be guaranteed in three scenarios. The first scenario is “state-state,” where the state is the promoter and executor of science. The second scenario is “state-company,” where the company is involved in the development of science and its eventual implementation, given that the state does not have the expertise or resources to promote it. Finally, the third scenario is “company-state,” where the state absorbs scientific development as a common good on behalf of the economic actors that carry out activities within its jurisdiction. In the first scenario, for example, the state’s obligations derived from the right to scientific progress involve guaranteeing the availability, accessibility, quality, and acceptability of the science produced (472). Thus, to guarantee availability, it is up to the state to ensure the production of scientific progress.

Guaranteeing the right to science in these three scenarios poses various challenges at the level of public policy, harmonious regulation, the full guarantee of access rights, and the interpretation of intersectionality in order to address the specific needs of vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples. Undoubtedly, the application of the content of this AO in different situations of potential and actual violation of the right to science will require deep reflection, and many scenarios may be covered by the Court’s interpretation of this right.

The right to science requires States to be willing to cooperate internationally (475), especially in the areas of technology transfer, financing and capacity building (264). In the context of the climate emergency, solutions for prevention and mitigation of impacts, and adaptation to damage encountered by a State, must be available to all. This is particularly important given the wide inequality in scientific production capacity among States. States at a competitive disadvantage are also those whose populations are most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, as they bear the burden of restrictions on their social and economic rights.

The Court clearly establishes the State’s duties to ensure the prevention and mitigation of harm, and does so while recognising that third parties, including companies, also have a role to play.  With regard to the right to science, for example, the Court extends the duty of active transparency—established in the case of the Rama and Kriol Peoples, Indigenous Black Creole Community of Bluefields and Others v. Nicaragua (238)—to the private sector as well (352). This is a recognition that all necessary information must be provided so that individuals can exercise other rights (489).

The right to science from the perspective of indigenous pluralism

The elements that feed science do not come solely from the West; their diversity is evident in Latin America, which is why it is essential to speak from a pluralistic perspective in the context of the climate emergency (480). Scientific pluralism implies taking into consideration indigenous ancestral knowledge in the conception, development and implementation of science, but with unrestricted respect for their self-determination.

The IACtHR is clear in stating that indigenous knowledge and developments must be taken into account, and this also includes their science. This Tribunal uses an evolutionary interpretation to define that the right to science includes access to culture — that is, local, traditional and indigenous knowledge — and the benefits that may be related to it (477). To define what constitutes the best available science, the Court established criteria that must be taken into consideration by States. Thus, the Court affirms that knowledge must be (i) the most up-to-date; (ii) based on peer-reviewed methodologies, practices, and internationally recognised scientific standards, where such standards exist; (iii) its dissemination follows rigorous review processes by high-quality peers or equivalent organisations; (iv) clearly communicate uncertainties and assumptions in the scientific basis of its conclusions; (v) be verifiable and reproducible through the publication of non-confidential data and models used to reach its conclusions; (vi) accurately present their sources of information, based on relevant, empirically tested and up-to-date scientific literature, without omitting, altering or misrepresenting relevant data and literature; and (vii) derive their conclusions accurately from the available data, without omitting, altering or misrepresenting relevant results (486).

The study of scientific pluralism is essential to understanding indigenous knowledge and thus making scientific developments dialogical. The study and comparison of indigenous and non-indigenous knowledge is undoubtedly complex for States and companies.

Companies and states can rely on “multidisciplinary expert reports” to learn about the indigenous scientific approach in any field of climate emergency research. Expert reports are a useful tool for comparing different systems and providing clear guidance to decision-makers. However, knowledge of indigenous science has clear limits linked to indigenous self-determination, which includes unrestricted respect for their territories and decision-making in the context of any economic project. In other words, the full authorisation of indigenous peoples is required to both develop and implement these expert reports and make indigenous science available.

However, the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in this framework of scientific pluralism should not be limited to situations where territories, lands and common natural resources may or may not be affected or impacted. Indigenous peoples have been recognised as guardians who preserve 80% of biodiversity , in their territories which is essential for a healthy environment and climate. Thus, indigenous knowledge must inevitably be taken into account in the framework of any scientific development, as has been done in some cases for the development of medicines and ecology, among others. In this scenario, both dimensions of the right to science—as a substantive and a procedural right—become evident. It is substantive in the sense that all peoples, including Indigenous peoples, are entitled to the benefits of scientific progress, while also recognizing that science must be plural in its conception, development, and application. At the same time, it is procedural, because for Indigenous peoples to effectively exercise this right, they must have access to the objectives and outcomes of scientific developments. Only then can they use such information to contribute, on equal footing, with their ancestral knowledge to mechanisms of prevention, mitigation, and reparation. This contribution must occur freely, without coercion or subjugation, since the right to science for Indigenous peoples entails a dual respect: their access to the knowledge produced by science, and their autonomy to decide when and how to share their own knowledge with it.

Conclusions

Advisory Opinion 32/25 of the Inter-American Court represents a milestone in linking climate emergency, human rights, and the right to science. The Court not only relied on the best available science to declare the existence of a climate emergency but also elevated the right to science as both a substantive entitlement—ensuring access to the benefits of scientific progress—and a procedural guarantee, enabling participation, access to information, and justice. By framing science as plural, inclusive of indigenous knowledge, the Court underscored that climate solutions must integrate diverse epistemologies and respect self-determination. Moreover, it extended obligations beyond states to corporations, recognizing their shared responsibility in transparency and mitigation efforts. Ultimately, AO 32/25 lays the foundation for a scientific democracy in the Americas, where science and democracy mutually reinforce each other: scientific knowledge informs democratic decision-making, while democratic principles ensure that science serves the public good. In this framework, the right to science becomes a crucial tool for prevention, adaptation, and reparation in response to the climate emergency.